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INTRODUCTION
Along with the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and international terrorism, the Director of
National Intelligence has identified the threat posed by
foreign intelligence as one of the top three national security
concerns to the United States.1 There are four million people
in the United States with access to classified government
information, and they are increasingly targeted by foreign
intelligence services interested in obtaining U.S. national
security-related information.2 As noted by the former Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Associate Deputy Director of
Operations for Counterintelligence before the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the intelligence
services of at least forty-one countries are attempting to
obtain classified U.S. government secrets.3 Indeed, Russian
intelligence operations in the United States have recently
returned to levels seen only during the height of the Cold
War.4
1. STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD ON THE WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT
OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 112th Cong. 1, at 3 (2011) (statement of James
R.
Clapper,
Director,
National
Intelligence),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20110210_testimony
_hpsci_clapper.pdf.
2. See How to Catch a Spy, TIME MAG., June 21 2005,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1074835,00.html.
3. SHARAD S. CHAUHAN, INSIDE C.I.A.: LESSONS IN INTELLIGENCE 357
(2004).
4. Michelle Van Cleave, Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It and What
Should We Do About It?, 51 STUD. IN INTELLIGENCE 1, 3 (2007), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/csipublications/csi
-studies/studies/vol51no2/Studies_v51no2_2007-5Jun.pdf. (stating that “foreign
powers increasingly are running intelligence operations with unprecedented
independence from their diplomatic establishments. . . . Russia, reversing a
sharp decline that took place during the late Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, now has
an intelligence presence in the United States equal to its Cold War level, a
sizing decision presumably indicative of the return on investment.”).
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For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
in 2010 arrested ten illegals—spies clandestinely inserted
into the United States by foreign intelligence services—for
conducting intelligence operations on behalf of Russia’s
primary external intelligence service—the SVR.5 The illegals
spent years, and in some cases decades, developing fake
identities in the United States while attempting to collect
intelligence for Russia and awaiting orders on future targets.6
While the arrests are certainly an accomplishment for U.S.
counterintelligence officials, this one network of illegals pales
in comparison to the pervasiveness of possible foreign
intelligence operations ongoing in the United States. Sergei
Tretyakov, the Russian intelligence officer responsible for
SVR operations in New York City from 1995 to 2005, revealed
that at one point he was in charge of sixty SVR officers in
addition to “160 contacts made up of illegals, outright spies,
and other people who knowingly or unknowingly could supply
information useful to Russia.”7 These figures are troubling—
they represent the activities of just one spy ring, from just
one foreign intelligence service, in just one U.S. city.
Another
concern
within
the
counterintelligence
community is the growing threat of economic and industrial
espionage.8 Foreign intelligence services are increasingly
seeking out information about sensitive technologies beyond
traditional military and government secrets.9 For example,
the Chinese government has developed a “pervasive
5. Walter Pincus, Fine Print: Despite Arrests, Russian ‘Illegals’ Won’t Go
Away, WASH. POST, July 13, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/12/AR2010071205341.html.
6. Ellen Barry, ‘Illegals’ Spy Ring Famed in Lore of Russian Spying, N.Y.
TIMES,
June
29,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/world/
europe/30sleepers.html.
7. Pincus, supra note 5.
8. OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC. (ONCIX), ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL
ESPIONAGE, FY 2008, at iii (2009), available at http://www.ncix.gov/publications
/reports/fecie_all/fecie_2008/2008_FECIE_Blue.pdf. Economic espionage is the
“knowing misappropriation of trade secrets with the knowledge or intent that
the offense will benefit a foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign
agent. Misappropriation includes, but is not limited to, stealing, copying,
altering, destroying, transmitting, sending, receiving, buying, possessing, or
conspiring to obtain trade secrets without authorization.” Id. at v. Examples of
trade secrets include “financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information.” Id.
9. See id. at iii.
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intelligence and security apparatus” that exploits the large
number of Chinese nationals traveling to the United States
seeking education and employment.10 The Deputy Director of
the FBI for Counterintelligence recently noted that there are
approximately 3200 Chinese front companies in the United
States operating for the sole purpose of gaining proprietary
information and sensitive technologies.11 For example, the
Department of Justice recently filed economic espionage
charges against five individuals and five companies controlled
by the People’s Republic of China for the theft of titanium
dioxide production technologies from E.I. du Pont de Nemours
and Company (commonly referred to as DuPont).12 And
China is not alone in this effort. The FBI stated that at least
one hundred countries are attempting to purchase sensitive
U.S. technologies, and fifty-seven of those countries are
actively “engaging in covert operations against U.S.
corporations.”13 Apart from China, the most aggressive
offenders noted by the FBI include France, Israel, Russia,
Iran, Cuba, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Japan,
Canada, India, and several Scandinavian countries.14
This paper proposes a novel weapon to combat the rising
tide of foreign intelligence threats: expansion of the U.S. AntiMoney Laundering (AML) regime to uncover financial
transactions related to foreign intelligence. Under current
U.S. AML laws, all financial institutions must monitor the
identities and financial transactions of their clients.15
Throughout this process, the institutions are required to
create a “profile” for all clients, and monitor their
transactions to ensure that the transactions are considered

10. Larry M. Wortzel, Risks and Opportunities of a Rising China, THE
HERITAGE FOUND., 6 (Jun. 22, 2006), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/
thf_media/2006/pdf/hl948.pdf.
11. Id.
12. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. AND CHINESE
DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND THEFT OF TRADE
SECRETS IN CONNECTION WITH CONSPIRACY TO SELL TRADE SECRETS TO
CHINESE COMPANIES (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2012/February/12-nsd-180.html.
13. HEDIEH NASHERI, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND INDUSTRIAL SPYING 8
(2005).
14. See id.
15. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l) (2011); see also 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2010); 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.18(a)(2).
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The financial
normal for that individual’s profile.16
institution must report any unusual activity, such as an
unexplained cash deposit, to the federal government.17 This
paper argues that financial institutions could alter their AML
programs to detect transactions that may suggest foreign
intelligence activity. A U.S. government employee makes an
unusual cash deposit in addition to his current wages. A
foreign national opens a bank account with suspicious
documentation and then receives regular wire transfers from
his home country, or from his home country traced through
an overseas third party. A corporation within the U.S.
defense industry engages in a transaction with a foreign shell
corporation for no apparent business purpose. Each of these
isolated situations may never catch the attention of
counterintelligence officials working in the United States.
Under this proposal, however, such transactions could trigger
AML suspicion and be reported to the federal government by
financial institutions.
Although financial institutions may already identify
some of these transactions as traditional money laundering or
terrorism finance efforts and report them to the federal
government under the current AML regime, there are three
reasons why change is needed. First, the agency that receives
reports of suspicious activity—the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—is woefully underfunded
for the number of reports it already receives.18 As such, it has
prioritized analysis of those reports that deal primarily with
terrorism finance.19
Suspicious transactions suggesting
foreign intelligence activity that would otherwise go
unnoticed
could
be
forwarded
immediately
to
counterintelligence elements of U.S. intelligence agencies for
further investigation.
Second, FinCEN has focused its resources on developing
typologies specific to general money laundering activity and

16. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a); 31 C.F.R. § 103.121.
17. 31 C.F.R. § 103.18.
18. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), SUMMARY OF THE THIRD MUTUAL
EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (2006), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/standardscodes/Documents/mer-executive-summary.pdf.
19. Id.
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terrorism finance.20 A typology describes “typical tactics used
by launderers or patterns that indicate a higher risk of
laundering,”21 and are provided to financial institutions so
that the institution actually understands what a suspicious
transaction would look like.22 At the present time, no
concerted effort has been made to develop typologies that
would suggest foreign intelligence activity.23 Thus, financial
institutions are unable to identify many transactions that
could suggest such activity.
Third, the pervasive threat that foreign intelligence
operations pose to the United States warrants heightened
scrutiny of those with access to classified information and
sensitive technologies.
Financial institutions should be
required to expand their due diligence efforts of clients
working within the federal government and within industries
with access to sensitive U.S. technologies.
Part I of this Article discusses foreign intelligence
activities and the threats they pose to U.S. security interests.
Part II discusses the current anti-money laundering regime
and the methods used to uncover illegal activity. Part III
advocates changes to the AML system necessary to identify
foreign intelligence activity. It also discusses potential issues
with compliance by financial institutions, and the need for
additional counterintelligence community discussions on
potential indicators and typologies for identifying
transactions that suggest foreign intelligence activity.

20. See id.
21. Richard K. Gordon, Trysts of Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the
Search for Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 726 (2008).
22. See PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, THE WORLD BANK, REFERENCE GUIDE TO
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM I-10
(2d ed. 2006) (“The various techniques used to launder money or finance
terrorism are generally referred to as methods or typologies.”).
23. For example, FATF’s most recent Global Money Laundering & Terrorist
Financing Threat Assessment provides an “overview of the systemic money
laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) threats and ultimate harms that
they can cause.”
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), GLOBAL MONEY
LAUNDERING & TERRORIST FINANCING THREAT ASSESSMENT 3 (2010),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Global%20Threat%20asses
sment.pdf. An extensive list of money laundering typologies and recommended
financial countermeasures is provided in Annex D. The document does not offer
any guidance on money laundering activities specific to the counterintelligence
field. See id. at 69–75.
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES

A. A General Overview of Intelligence Activities
At the most basic level, intelligence activities offer “a
particular kind of information that helps to inform, instruct,
and educate the policy world.”24
Intelligence missions
generally fall into one of three categories: (1) collection and
analysis, (2) counterintelligence, or (3) covert action.25 The
first form of intelligence—collection and analysis—focuses on
gathering information from technical sources (TECHINT),26
signals intelligence (SIGINT),27 human sources (HUMINT),
and open-source literature (OSINT).28 Once this information
is collected, it is amassed and processed by intelligence
officers to offer insight to relevant geopolitical issues.29 This
new information is then disseminated to policymakers.30
The
second
type
of
intelligence
mission—
counterintelligence—comprises those activities intended to
defeat foreign intelligence officers collecting information.31
For
example,
Executive
Order
12333
defines
counterintelligence, in part, as “information gathered and
activities conducted to protect against espionage, other
intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted
for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or
international terrorist activities.”32 This can include both the
discovery of moles within the country’s own intelligence

24. MICHAEL A. TURNER, WHY SECRET INTELLIGENCE FAILS 3 (2005).
Turner defines intelligence as “policy-relevant information, collected through
open and clandestine means and subjected to analysis, for the purposes of
educating, enlightening, or helping American decision makers in formulating
and implementing national security and foreign policy.” Id. at 4.
25. Loch K. Johnson, An Introduction to the Intelligence Studies Literature,
in STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 1: UNDERSTANDING THE HIDDEN SIDE OF
GOVERNMENT 1, 4 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2007).
26. Id. TECHINT could include images from satellites and reconnaissance
planes. Id.
27. Id.
SIGINT is the interception of signals such as telephone
conversations or electronic communications. See id.
28. Id. OSINT could include information from newspapers or public
speeches. Id.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 6.
32. Exec. Order No. 12333 § 3.4(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
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services33 and foreign intelligence assets working within the
country.34 However, counterintelligence efforts also include
providing personnel security, protecting information that
counterintelligence officials believe foreign governments
would be interested in obtaining, and misleading and
misdirecting foreign spies away from the country’s real
secrets.35
Covert action, the third type of intelligence mission, is
activity intended to “secretly influence and manipulate events
abroad.”36
These activities can include “the use of
propaganda, political activities, economic disruption, and
paramilitary operations.”37 In the United States, covert
activities have included the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961 and
the Iran-contra affair in 1986.38 While the U.S. Intelligence
Community is actively engaged in each of these efforts, this
Article focuses on the second: defeating foreign intelligence
activities adverse to U.S. interests.
B. Foreign Intelligence Threats to the United States
The “treasure trove” of U.S. information targeted by
foreign intelligence threats lies within the United States.39
This is because foreign intelligence officers are primarily
concerned with three things: (1) the organizations and
individuals responsible for setting American policy; (2) the
research and development efforts of U.S. weapons, nuclear,
and technological enterprise industries; and (3) the facilities
and employees engaged in classified national security
efforts.40 U.S. activity in these three areas is primarily
conducted domestically; thus, the majority of foreign
intelligence threats are engaged in activity within U.S.

33. Some of the best sources of intelligence are citizens of the target
country. KATHERINE L. HERBIG & MARTIN F. WISKOFF, DEF. PERSONNEL SEC.
RESEARCH CTR., ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BY AMERICAN
CITIZENS 1947–2001, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.dhra.mil/
perserec/reports/tr02-05.pdf.
34. See TURNER, supra note 24, at 126.
35. Id.
36. Johnson, supra note 25, at 7.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 3.
40. See id.
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borders.41
In the intelligence community, there are two types of
foreign intelligence case officers that travel to the United
States: those who operate under diplomatic or official “cover,”
and those who do not.42 Intelligence officers working under
official cover enter the United States as a member of the
country’s diplomatic corps or as a military liaison.43 This
employment is a pretense; they are provided a cover story and
normal identification cards, but actively engage in
intelligence collection activities in that target country.44
Historically, U.S. counterintelligence efforts have focused on
“embassies and other diplomatic establishments . . . because
of the operational security they afford.”45 As such, the United
States can usually identify these spies without issue; routine
surveillance can easily be conducted on foreigners working in
embassies within the United States.46
However, some foreign intelligence case officers work
under “nonofficial cover,” meaning they have no official
connections with their home country’s government.47 These
officers typically work in commercial or private enterprises as
a pretense, engaging in intelligence collection activities on the
side for their home country.48 These nonofficial cover agents
Foreign
are sometimes referred to as “illegals.”49
governments secretly insert these illegals into the United
States making it hard to identify them because they
“masquerade as ordinary Americans.”50
In recent years, globalization has promoted the use of the
illegals
technique.
A
former
U.S.
National
Counterintelligence Executive notes that “we have seen a
growing number of intelligence operations within our borders,
facilitated by an extensive foreign presence that provides

41. Id. at 4 n.d (“Three-quarters of the U.S. [counterintelligence] budget
since World War II has been devoted to activities within the United States
. . . .”).
42. See TURNER, supra note 24, at 90–91.
43. Id. at 90.
44. See id. at 91.
45. Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 3.
46. See TURNER, supra note 24, at 132.
47. See id. at 91.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 132.
50. Id.
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cover for intelligence services and their agents.”51
continued:

She

Foreign powers increasingly are running intelligence
operations with unprecedented independence from their
diplomatic establishments. The number of formal and
informal ports of entry to the country, the ease with which
people can travel internally, and the relatively benign
operational environment of the United States are tailor
made for embedded clandestine collection activities.
Thousands of foreign owned commercial establishments in
the United States, the routine interactions of trade and
transnational business and finance, and the exchange of
hundreds of thousands of students and academicians, all
potentially extend the reach of foreign intelligence into the
core structures of our nation’s security.52

In this globalized world, there is now even a “market” for
U.S. national security-related information.53
Indeed,
counterintelligence officials believe that the intelligence
services of at least forty-one countries are attempting to
obtain classified U.S. government secrets.54
Of great concern is the fact that illegals have increasingly
targeted U.S. economic and commercial secrets.55 Under
attack are corporations, research centers, and universities.56
In FY 2007, the FBI opened fifty-five new cases of economic
espionage and continued investigations of another eightyeight cases.57
In FY 2008, Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement arrested 158 individuals on charges related to
the exportation of sensitive U.S. technologies.58 In that same
time period, the Department of Commerce investigated an
51. Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 3.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 2; see also RICHARD A. BEST, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41848,
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION: NEED-TO-KNOW VS. NEED-TO-SHARE 12 (2011)
(“Foreign countries (including friendly ones or even allies) may not turn down
opportunities to gain insight into U.S. policymaking or military capabilities.
Various anti-American organizations worldwide eagerly seek information that
can damage or embarrass the U.S. Government. Major media outlets, not all of
which are in foreign countries, consider themselves free to publish classified
information regardless of possible damage to U.S. persons, interests, or foreign
supporters. There is, in short, an active market for classified information . . . .”).
54. CHAUHAN, supra note 3, at 357.
55. TURNER, supra note 24, at 132.
56. Id.
57. ONCIX, supra note 8, at 1.
58. Id.
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additional 792 export violations.59 Individuals arrested for
economic and industrial espionage against the United States
have come from countries including China, Cuba, India, and
Iran.60 However, evidence suggests that fifty-seven nations
are actively engaging in covert activity against U.S.
corporations, and forty-three more are attempting to
purchase sensitive U.S. technologies.61 While the United
States has focused the majority of its counterintelligence
assets on threats to government secrets, recent trends have
required it to shift some of these resources to protecting
commercial secrets.62
Both types of foreign intelligence officers—cover and
nonofficial cover agents—also actively seek to recruit
Americans whose employment offers them access to secret
information.63 In fact, most illegals enter the country to
gather information on those who could potentially be turned
as spies, foregoing opportunities to collect information
themselves.64 The problem is pervasive; the U.S. government
has caught and convicted over one thousand American
citizens for acts of espionage since World War II.65
The first step in thwarting foreign intelligence activities
is to identify who the foreign intelligence assets are.66 While
U.S. counterintelligence may have a good grasp on the
identities of official cover agents working in the United
States, more hidden are the illegals and the Americans
committing espionage.67 Uncovering these hidden spies and
their cover organizations is a primary goal for U.S.
counterintelligence officials, and is the focus of this Article.
C. United States Agencies Engaged in Counterintelligence
Activities
The majority of counterintelligence activity conducted by
the United States is shared between the FBI, CIA, and

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
See id. app. B, at 9–12.
See NASHERI, supra note 13, at 8.
See TURNER, supra note 24, at 127.
See Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 3.
See Pincus, supra note 5.
TURNER, supra note 24, at 134.
See id. at 132.
Id.
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Department of Defense.68 The CIA is generally responsible
for those counterintelligence activities outside U.S. borders.69
Within the United States, the CIA counterintelligence team is
tasked only with the security of its own employees unless
working in conjunction with the FBI.70 Some departments
and agencies have specialized counterintelligence units, with
mission-specific objectives. For example, the Department of
Defense has counterintelligence units throughout its
branches and within its Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).71
But the lion’s share of domestic counterintelligence activity
falls to the FBI.72 In fact, three-fourths of all money spent on
U.S. counterintelligence efforts since World War II has been
on the FBI’s domestic counterintelligence program.73
During the 1990s, President Clinton formed both the
National Counterintelligence Center (NCIC) and the National
Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to provide a cohesive
approach to U.S. counterintelligence efforts.74 However,
commentators note that both organizations have been
ineffective in this regard, leaving much of the
counterintelligence
decision-making
with
individual
agencies.75
II. AML REGULATIONS
To understand how the AML regime can be applied to
counterintelligence activity, it is important first to
understand the crime of money laundering, the international
standards that led to AML efforts within the United States,
and the specific U.S. laws that implement these international
standards.

68. See id. at 36.
69. Exec. Order No. 12333 §§ 1.8(a)–(d), 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981);
see also TURNER, supra note 24, at 99.
70. Exec. Order No. 12333 §§ 1.8(a), (h), 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981);
see also TURNER, supra note 24, at 36.
71. See TURNER, supra note 24, at 28–30; Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 2.
72. See 50 U.S.C. § 402a(e) (2005) (“Coordination of counterintelligence
matters with Federal Bureau of Investigation.”); see also TURNER, supra note
24, at 99.
73. Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 4 n.d.
74. TURNER, supra note 24, at 127.
75. See id. at 127–28; Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 1–2.
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A. The Crime of Money Laundering
Money laundering is “the process by which proceeds from
a criminal activity are disguised to conceal their illicit
origins.”76 A predicate offense is criminal activity that
generates proceeds, which when laundered, leads to the crime
of money laundering.77 While the international community’s
first attempts to criminalize the act of money laundering
focused on crimes related to drug trafficking,78 later treaties
require countries to criminalize money laundering to “the
widest range of predicate offenses.”79
As a hypothetical, Donny Dealer sells one thousand
dollars’ worth of drugs to his neighbor. Donny takes that
cash, enters a casino, and trades the cash for chips. He
gambles for a few minutes and then redeems the chips at the
casino, but asks the casino to deposit the money into his bank
account. Donny now has about one thousand dollars in his
bank account and, if questioned about the origins of this
money, can claim that he won all of it at the casino. He then
uses that money to purchase a used moped, perhaps to
expand his customer base. The predicate offense in this
example would be the sale of illegal narcotics. But, Donny
would also be culpable for the crime of money laundering,
because he took the proceeds of his crime and attempted to
disguise their illicit origins.
Money laundering activities generally include three
stages: placement, layering and integration.80 Following the
generation of proceeds of crime, money laundering

76. SCHOTT, supra note 22, at I-1 (emphasis omitted).
77. Id. at I-3.
78. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, 1998, Dec. 19, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493, available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf.
79. See SCHOTT, supra note 22, at I-3 (quoting United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention), art. 6(2)(a)
(2000), available at http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/
final_documents_2/convention_eng.pdf). For example, the United States has
classified all Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) predicate
offenses, such as murder, kidnapping, and extortion, as well as numerous other
federal crimes, as money laundering predicate offenses. CHARLES DOYLE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22401, MONEY LAUNDERING: AN ABRIDGED
OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. 1956 AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 2 (2012).
For a comprehensive list of predicate offenses in the United States, see 18
U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2012).
80. SCHOTT, supra note 22, at I-7.
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commences with the placement of the proceeds into the
financial system.81 The primary purpose of this step is to
introduce “dirty” money into the system “without attracting
the attention of financial institutions or law enforcement.”82
This can be a deposit at a bank, a purchase of an asset like an
automobile, the exchange of currency, or the conversion into
financial instruments such as money orders or checks.83 In
our example, Donny Dealer engaged in placement of his
illegal proceeds when he exchanged the cash for casino chips.
Following placement, the money launderer will engage in
layering.84 Layering can include a range of activities such as
moving or selling the bank deposits, financial instruments, or
purchased assets to different financial institutions.85 The
money launderer may use overseas shell corporations in this
step, may hide the transfer as a payment for goods or
services, or may merely transfer the placed money among
several banks.86 The purpose of this step is to “create
confusion and complicate the paper trail.”87 Donny Dealer
engaged in placement activities when he cashed in his casino
chips and transferred his “winnings” to his bank account.
Finally, the money launderer must engage in
integration.88 This involves integrating the funds back into
It is often accomplished by
the legitimate economy.89
purchasing an asset such as real estate, securities, or luxury
goods.90 The purpose of doing so would be to provide the
criminal with a “plausible explanation for the source of the
funds.”91 Donny Dealer integrated his proceeds of crime back
into the legitimate economy by purchasing the moped. He
now has legitimate title to the vehicle and can use it or sell it
without raising suspicion.

81. Id.
82. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL (FFIEC), BANK SECRECY
ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 12 (2010), available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/BSA_AML_Man_2010.pdf.
83. See SCHOTT, supra note 22, at I-7.
84. Id. at I-8.
85. Id.
86. Id. at I-8–I-9.
87. FFIEC, supra note 82, at 12.
88. SCHOTT, supra note 22, at I-9.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. FFIEC, supra note 82, at 12.
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B. International Techniques to Combat Money Laundering
Activities
Countries that implement effective techniques to combat
money laundering see significant benefits to their
economies.92 Anti-money laundering efforts can assist in
fighting crime and corruption,93 enhance the stability of
and
encourage
economic
financial
institutions,94
95
development. In order to develop an international response
to money laundering, the G-7 countries formed the Financial
Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) in 1989.96
FATF adopted “Forty Recommendations,” which are now
regarded as the relevant international standard for AML.97
Any country desiring to comply with international AML
standards must implement laws in its own country that fulfill
these Forty Recommendations.98
While the Forty
Recommendations cover a wide range of legal requirements,
the most pertinent to counterintelligence activities are those
pertaining to prevention and discovery of money laundering
activity.

92. See SCHOTT, supra note 22, at II-7.
93. See id. (“When money laundering itself is made a crime, it provides
another avenue to prosecute criminals, both those who commit the underlying
criminal acts and those who assist them through laundering illegally obtained
funds. Similarly, an [AML] framework that includes bribery as a predicate
offense and is enforced effectively provides fewer opportunities for criminals to
bribe or otherwise corrupt public officials.”).
94. Id. at II-8 (“Public confidence in financial institutions, and hence their
stability, is enhanced by sound banking practices that reduce financial risks to
their operations.”).
95. See id. at II-8–II-9 (“Money laundering has a direct negative effect on
economic growth by diverting resources to less productive activities. . . . Rather
than being placed in productive channels for further investment, laundered
funds are often placed into ‘sterile’ investments to preserve their value or make
them more easily transferable. . . . Even worse, criminal organizations may
transform productive enterprises into sterile investments by operating them for
the primary purpose of laundering illegal proceeds, rather than as profitgenerating enterprises.”).
96. Id. at III-7. G-7 countries include Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at III-7 n.30. FATF
later also assumed responsibilities for combating the financing of terrorism. Id.
at III-8.
97. Id. at III-9.
98. See id.
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1. Customer Identification and Due Diligence
The first AML prevention technique required by FATF
involves customer identification and due diligence. More
commonly known as Know-Your-Customer (KYC) rules,99 this
group of recommendations requires countries to implement
laws that place duties on banking and financial institutions
to keep detailed records on their customers.100 To this end,
financial institutions must at all times verify the true
identities of their clients.101 Where the client is a legal entity,
such as a corporation, the financial institution must take
reasonable steps to determine the true parent company and
owner of the client.102 Where the institution has reason to
believe that the client is acting on behalf of a third party, the
financial institution should take similar due diligence
measures to verify the identity of this third-party
beneficiary.103
Institutions must also collect information on the nature
of the business relationship it will have with the client.104
Using this information, the institution must create a profile
for each client so that the institution can understand what
financial transactions would be normal for that client.105 The
institution is required to conduct ongoing due diligence in
light of this profile, scrutinizing the client’s transactions to
ensure that they are “consistent with the institution’s
knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile,
including, where necessary, the source of funds.”106
Returning to the previous example, when Donny Dealer
opened his bank account, he had to provide documentation to
99. Id. at VI-3 & n.6 (citing BASEL COMM., CORE PRINCIPLE FOR EFFECTIVE
BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLE 15 (1997) as the origin of the term “knowyour-customer”).
100. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 4–7 (2010),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20Standards
%20-%2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf; SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-2.
101. FATF, supra note 100, at 4–5.
102. Id. at 5; SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-4 (“When corporations or legal
entities are involved, appropriate due diligence measures should be employed to
determine the identity of the actual parent or controlling entity.”).
103. FATF, supra note 100, at 5; SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-4 (“If there is
any reason to suspect that the customer is acting on behalf of another person or
entity, appropriate due diligence measures should be instituted.”).
104. FATF, supra note 100, at 5.
105. See id.
106. Id.
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prove his identity, and when asked about his profession,
Donny informed the bank that he was a law professor. As a
law professor, the bank would expect to see a salary paid into
his account on a regular basis, as these transactions would be
typical for a law professor. If Donny were to deposit one
million dollars cash in small bills over the course of a year,
this would raise red flags at Donny’s bank, and the bank
would need to investigate further and perhaps even report
the transactions to the government. In contrast, Donny’s
neighbor, Gus, owns a gas station. If Gus were to deposit one
million dollars cash in small bills into his bank account over
the course of one year, the bank may consider this normal in
light of Gus’s business, and forego further scrutiny.
Certain types of risky clients automatically warrant
heightened scrutiny under FATF’s recommendations because
FATF considers them more likely to engage in money
laundering activities.107
For example, clients that are
classified as Politically Exposed Persons (PEP) require
heightened due diligence.108 FATF defines PEPs, in part, as
“individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent
public functions in a foreign country.”109 Examples of PEPs
include Heads of State, senior government officials or
politicians, members of a country’s judiciary, and highranking military officials.110 Risky clients may also include
foreigners, legal persons such as trusts that are merely
personal asset holding vehicles, and companies that have
nominee shareholders or shares in bearer form.111
Certain transactions also warrant heightened due
diligence.112
Recommendation eleven requires financial
institutions to afford increased scrutiny to “all complex,
unusual large transactions, and all unusual patterns of
transactions, which have no apparent economic or visible

107. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING
COMPLIANCE WITH THE FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE FATF 9 SPECIAL
RECOMMENDATIONS 17 (2009), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/
fatf/documents/reports/methodology.pdf (“Financial institutions should be
required to perform enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories of
customer, business relationship or transaction.”).
108. See FATF, supra note 100, at 5–6.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id.
111. FATF, supra note 107, at 17.
112. FATF, supra note 100, at 7.
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The Recommendation requires the
lawful purpose.”113
institution to ascertain, “as far as possible,” the
circumstances and purpose of the transaction.114 Institutions
should document the findings in writing and make them
available to law enforcement authorities.115
2. Suspicious Transaction Reporting
Upon discovery of any transaction that appears to involve
money laundering, a financial institution must report that
information to its country’s Financial Intelligence Unit
(FIU).116
When determining which transactions involve
money laundering, financial institutions must rely upon the
risk profiles created for each account and create systems that
screen transactions for abnormal activity.117
Financial
institutions need not have evidence that the client is engaged
in money laundering before it reports the transaction to its
FIU.118 Instead, institutions must merely have “ ‘suspicion’
that funds may be related to a criminal offense.”119
In Donny Dealer’s case, it probably would not be
abnormal for a law professor to win one thousand dollars at a
casino; therefore, Donny’s bank probably would not report the
transfer of those funds from the casino. The casino, however,
may find it suspicious if Donny trades cash for chips, and
then trades in the chips for a bank deposit shortly after. This
may rise to the level of abnormality that would require the
casino to report the transaction to its country’s FIU.
3. Cash Transaction Reporting
While not a requirement for a country to remain in
compliance with international AML standards, FATF
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 8.
117. SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-19 (noting that any of the following may
require further investigation: “[a]ssets withdrawn immediately after they are
credited to an account,” “[a] dormant account suddenly becomes active without
any plausible reason,” “[t]he high asset value of a client is not compatible with
either the information concerning the client or the relevant business,” “[a] client
provides false or doctored information or refuses to communicate requiring
information to the bank,” and “[t]he arrangement of a transaction either
insinuates an unlawful purpose, is economically illogical or unidentifiable.”).
118. Id. at VI-21.
119. Id.
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recommends that countries implement laws requiring cash
transaction reporting.120 Specifically, this would require
financial institutions to report any transaction involving cash
or its functional equivalent in an amount greater than the
threshold level set by that country.121
Of course, these threshold levels are known by criminals
as well.
Therefore, FATF recommends that financial
institutions aggregate all cash transactions conducted over
the course of a certain time period, such as one day, to ensure
that the client cannot avoid reporting requirements by
engaging in many small transactions instead of one big
transaction.122 Furthermore, financial institutions may find
suspicious those cash transactions that are just below the
reporting threshold, and the financial institution may report
the transaction to its FIU regardless.123
C. United States-Specific Regulations
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA) and the Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986, both as amended by the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2002, implement the United States’ AML
measures as required by the FATF recommendations.124
Under this regime, all financial institutions are required to
implement AML systems which must include “the
development of internal policies, procedures and controls,”
“the designation of a compliance officer,” “an ongoing
employee training program,” and “an independent audit
function to test programs.”125 The financial institution must
implement a Customer Identification Program (CIP) that
includes risk-based procedures that “enable the bank to form
a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of each
customer.”126 Furthermore, heightened due diligence must be

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See FATF, supra note 100, at 7–8.
SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-24.
Id. at VI-25.
Id.
U.S. S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, MONEY
LAUNDERING AND FOREIGN CORRUPTION: ENFORCEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE PATRIOT ACT 9, (2004), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public
/_files/ACF5F8.pdf; FATF, supra note 18, at 3.
125. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1) (2011); FATF, supra note 18, at 5.
126. 31 C.F.R. § 103.121(b)(2) (2010). See id. for a comprehensive list of all
procedures financial institutions must implement to comply with U.S. CIP
requirements.
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observed for foreign financial institutions and wealthy foreign
individuals.127
Where a financial institution in the United States
uncovers a suspicious transaction, that financial institution
must report it to the U.S. FIU: FinCEN.128 The United States
created FinCEN in 1990, under the umbrella of the U.S.
Treasury Department.129
FinCEN does not investigate
financial crimes, but serves as a “central source for financial
intelligence information and analysis.”130 It has primary
responsibility over all AML reports filed in the United
States.131 Unfortunately, the sheer number of Suspicious
Activity Reports (SARs) filed by financial institutions
prevents effective analysis and review of each one.132 In 2004,
FinCEN received over fourteen million reports, including
600,000 SARs.133 Accordingly, FinCEN has prioritized those
reports most valuable to law enforcement, such as those
directly related to terrorism finance.134
In particular, a bank must report a transaction that is
more than five thousand dollars and where the bank “knows,
suspects, or has reason to suspect that:” (1) the transaction
involves the proceeds of crime; (2) the transaction is “designed
to evade” AML rules and reporting requirements; or (3) the
transaction “has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is
not the sort in which the particular customer would normally
be expected to engage, and the bank knows of no reasonable
explanation for the transaction after examining the available
facts, including the background and possible purpose of the
transaction.”135 The bank must file a government-issued SAR
form within thirty calendar days of discovering the suspicious
For obvious reasons, the
nature of the transaction.136
employees of the notifying institution may not disclose that
127.
128.
129.
130.

31 U.S.C. § 5318(i).
See id. at (g).
FATF, supra note 18, at 3.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-141, ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING: IMPROVED COMMUNICATION COULD ENHANCE THE SUPPORT
FINCEN PROVIDES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 6 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10141.pdf.
131. See FATF, supra note 18, at 3.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 31 C.F.R. § 103.18(a)(2) (2010).
136. Id. at (b)(3).
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such a report was made to anyone involved in the
transaction.137
The BSA also implemented rules for cash transaction
reporting in the United States. Financial institutions must
keep a record and report any transaction using cash or bearer
instruments in excess of $10,000.138 These reports are
compiled into a computerized database and shared with all
law enforcement agencies involved in AML activities,139 such
as the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Secret Service.140
D. Suspicious Activity Reports in the United States
The most recent version of the U.S. SAR form can be
found on FinCEN’s website.141 Part I of the form asks for
information identifying the financial institution, such as its
name, address, and Federal Tax Identification Number.142
Part II of the form requires extensive identifying information
about the suspect, including his or her name, address, social
security or tax identification number, contact information,
occupation, date of birth, and relationship to the
institution.143
Part III asks in-depth questions about the nature of the
suspicious activity being reported.144 Required information
includes the total dollar amount involved, the dates that the
transaction took place, and those law enforcement agencies
that might have already been notified.145 Part III also
includes a question asking the financial institution to
characterize the nature of the suspicion using a series of
checkboxes.146 The checkboxes are labeled “a” through “u,”
and include such characterizations as “Bank Secrecy

137.
138.
139.
140.

31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (2011).
SCHOTT, supra note 22, at VI-24.
FATF, supra note 18, at 4.
See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (FINCEN), 14 THE SAR
ACTIVITY REV. 1, n.1 (2008).
141. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (FINCEN), SUSPICIOUS
ACTIVITY REPORT (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fincen.gov/forms/
files/f9022-47_sar-di.pdf.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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Act/Structuring/Money
Laundering,”
“Bribery/Gratuity,”
“Computer
Intrusion,”
“Credit
Card
Fraud,”
“Defalcation/Embezzlement,” and “Identity Theft,” among
others.147 Thus, the form is used to report more than just
money laundering.148 Following the USA PATRIOT Act
amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act, an additional checkbox
“t” was added to the form for “Terrorist Financing.”149 Part IV
of the form requires contact information for someone at the
financial institution who may be able to provide further
assistance to law enforcement, if necessary.150
Part V may be the most critical portion of the form.151 It
requires a lengthy free response, detailing the transaction
and the reasons the financial institution may suspect illegal
financial activity.152 The financial institution must also
describe any supporting documentation it has and all parties
involved in the transaction.153
To assist financial institutions in reporting suspicious
activity, FinCEN provides technical manuals and analytic
reports to improve understanding of how money may be
laundered in the future and how to identify it.154 In addition,
FinCEN issues regulations and interpretive guidance for
financial institutions.155 For example, FinCEN regularly
publishes the SAR Activity Review, a periodical that provides
“meaningful information about the preparation, use, and

147. Id.
148. The following is a comprehensive list of the checkboxes included on the
form: Bank Secrecy Act/Structuring/Money Laundering, Bribery/Gratuity,
Check Fraud, Check Kiting, Commercial Loan Fraud, Computer Intrusion,
Consumer Loan Fraud, Counterfeit Check, Counterfeit Credit/Debit Card,
Counterfeit Instrument (other), Credit Card Fraud, Debit Card Fraud,
Defalcation/Embezzlement, False Statement, Misuse of Position or Self Dealing,
Mortgage Loan Fraud, Mysterious Disappearance, Wire Transfer Fraud, Other
(free response), Terrorist Financing, and Identity Theft. Id.
149. See id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 130, at
2 (discussing how the USA Patriot Act “expanded FinCEN’s role to include a
focus on terrorism financing as well as money laundering”).
150. FINCEN, supra note 141.
151. Id. (“This section of the report is critical. The care with which it is
written may make the difference in whether or not the described conduct and its
possible criminal nature are clearly understood.”).
152. Id.
153. See id. for a complete list of requirements for this free response
question.
154. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 130, at 9.
155. FFIEC, supra note 82, at 9.
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value of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) filed by financial
institutions.”156 Financial institutions rely upon FinCEN’s
findings and advice in identifying suspicious activity and
when designing their detection algorithms used in their AML
programs.157
III. RECOMMENDATION: IMPLEMENT A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
DETECTION PROGRAM THAT BUILDS UPON THE CURRENT ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING REQUIREMENTS
In response to growing concerns over terrorism finance,
the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the scope of the AML
requirements on financial institutions within the United
States.158 It provided the Secretary of the Treasury with the
authority to impose on financial institutions requirements to
store records and file suspicious activity reports when doing
so would be useful for counterintelligence activities related to
counterterrorism efforts.159 This Article recommends that the
scope of this requirement be expanded to encompass all U.S.
counterintelligence activity, building off of the U.S. AML
regime in a similar manner. Supporting this proposition,
commentators have argued the efficacy of managing foreign
intelligence threats similarly to those threats posed by
international terrorism, including financial analysis.160
Detailed in this section are the workflows that should be
implemented to coordinate this new counterintelligence
program, suggestions for promoting compliance by financial
institutions, and possible typologies for identifying foreign
intelligence activity.

156. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (FINCEN), SAR ACTIVITY
REVIEW—TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/
sar_tti.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
157. See, e.g., Cheng-wei Zhang & Yu-bo Wang, Research on Application of
Distributed Data Mining in Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring System, 2D
INT’L CONF. ON ADVANCED COMPUTER CONTROL 133 (2010) (“Some developed
countries have constituted a set of electronic system[s] to detect moneylaundering by the use of Expert System and Artificial Intelligence. For
example, the FinCen in America built the FAIS . . . .”).
158. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 130, at 7.
159. Id.
160. See Van Cleave, supra note 4, at 5 (“There is a parallel for thinking
about counterintelligence as a strategic mission. Just as [U.S.] intelligence is
mapping the essential features and activities of terrorist groups, so
[counterintelligence] analysts could determine how foreign intelligence services
are built and operate—call it [counterintelligence] order-of-battle preparation.”).
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A. Require Financial Institutions to File Suspicious Activity
Reports for Suspected Foreign Intelligence Financial
Transactions
The recommended workflow for the proposed
counterintelligence program follows the practices and
procedures already implemented in the current U.S. AML
regime. Financial institutions would be required to make
changes to their AML detection programs so that they could
identify suspicious transactions that suggest possible foreign
intelligence activity. Part III.C of this Article discusses
recommendations for identifying these transactions. Upon
discovering such a transaction, the financial institution would
be required to retain documentation of the transaction and
conduct an investigation into the transaction and the related
clients, if possible. Following this investigation, the financial
institution would be required to file a SAR with FinCEN
noting its findings. The SAR form currently in use would
remain substantially the same, with one modification: an
additional checkbox labeled “Foreign Intelligence” would be
added. The financial institution would check this box, and
describe why it believes the transaction suggests foreign
intelligence activity within the free response box in Part V of
the SAR form.
Given the unwieldy volume of SARs already submitted to
FinCEN and its inadequate resources to review all such
reports,161 review authority should fall to agencies already
tasked with counterintelligence responsibilities.
Foreign
intelligence SARs filed with FinCEN would be forwarded to a
new counterintelligence SAR review team.162 Representatives
from counterintelligence agencies responsible for domestic
operations, such as the FBI, CIA and DIA, would comprise
the team. However, the FBI should be responsible for leading
the review team in light of its dominant role in domestic
counterintelligence activity.163

161. See FATF, supra note 18, at 3.
162. This approach would mimic the SAR review teams recommended in the
U.S. Department of Treasury’s National Money Laundering Strategy, and the
review teams currently implemented by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. See
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-813, COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING:
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE THE NATIONAL STRATEGY 26 (2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03813.pdf.
163. Furthermore, the FBI is responsible for the investigation of money
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Further investigation would be at the discretion of the
review team in light of the surrounding circumstances. For
example, the review team may decide to forward the case to
the FBI for investigation and possible prosecution. Or, the
review team may decide that it would be more appropriate to
engage in offensive counterintelligence measures through
another agency, such as turning the identified individual into
a double agent or providing the individual with
misinformation intended to deceive the foreign intelligence
service.164 FinCEN already provides direct access to its SAR
databases to law enforcement agencies,165 meaning the review
team could easily access the data. If a counterintelligence
checkbox is added to the SAR form, this discrete piece of data
could be used to distinguish those SARs in the FinCEN
database. Furthermore, FinCEN could even limit the review
team’s access to those SARs related to counterintelligence, if
that is preferred.
B. Promoting Compliance by the Financial Institutions
Disincentives exist for financial institutions to comply
with these new requirements. Under the AML regime,
financial institutions are responsible for financing the
preventive measures such as the one proposed in this
Article.166 To pay for these programs, financial institutions
usually must increase fees charged to clients, reduce overall
profits, or do both.167 However, compliance can be achieved
by emphasizing those benefits that the financial institutions
will derive through cooperation, as well as through designing
the program to include additional economic incentives for
those institutions that properly report counterintelligence
laundering related to crimes over which it has jurisdiction. FATF, supra note
18, at 4.
164. See, e.g., Walter Pincus, New Unit of DIA Will Take the Offensive on
Counterintelligence, WASH. POST, Aug. 18 2008, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/08/17/AR2008081702244.
html (“The purpose of an offensive counterintelligence operation is not criminal
prosecution . . . . In strategic offensive counterintelligence operations, a foreign
intelligence officer is the target, and the main goals most often are ‘to gather
information, to make something happen. . . to thwart what the opposition is
trying to do to us and to learn more about what they’re trying to get from us.’ ”
(quoting Toby Sullivan, Director of Counterintelligence)).
165. FATF, supra note 18, at 3.
166. Gordon, supra note 21, at 727.
167. Id.
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SARs.
The first argument for cooperation by financial
institutions is that it will assist the bank in providing
prudential security. Prudential rules “are designed primarily
to protect the safety and soundness of individual financial
institutions and the financial system as a whole.”168
Financial institutions implement these rules to prevent the
consequences stemming from risk related to significant loan
defaults, or “putting all investment (typically lending) eggs in
one financial basket.”169 Those foreign intelligence operations
that are uncovered often lead to asset confiscation by the
Because illegals are increasingly using
government.170
businesses in the United States under nonofficial cover, a
financial institution that fails to comply with this new
counterintelligence reporting regime may suffer financial
setbacks if a discovered foreign intelligence cover business
represents a significant portion of the institution’s customer
base.171
Financial institutions may ask: if the assets seized are to
be confiscated, why would the institution have an incentive to
turn in one of its clients? Under this new counterintelligence
program, disincentives could be overcome by offering the
financial institution a portion of the confiscated assets. More
specifically, where banks submit a SAR detailing the
possibility of foreign intelligence activity, the government
could compensate banks with these assets. Where a foreign
intelligence operation is discovered by law enforcement,
however, and the financial institution failed to file a SAR
when there was activity that should have raised suspicion or
the institution failed to implement an adequate foreign
intelligence detection system, the government would not

168. Id. at 706.
169. Id.
170. See Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Ten Russian Agents Plead Guilty and are to be Removed from the United States
(Jul.
8,
2010),
available
at
http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/pressreleases/2010/nyfo070810a.htm (“[T]he defendants were required to disclose
their true identities in court today and to forfeit certain assets attributable to
the criminal offenses.”).
171. This is known as concentration risk. See DIANE REYNOLDS, ANALYZING
CONCENTRATION RISK (2009), available at http://www.algorithmics.com/
EN/media/pdfs/Algo-WP0109AnalyzingConRisk.pdf for a detailed explanation of
calculating concentration and credit risk.
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compensate the institution from the seized assets. Thus, the
financial institution will have economic incentives to
implement this proposal effectively within their AML
program; if they do not, they will lose out on this
compensation.
To sweeten the pot, the FBI could offer a cash reward to
any financial institution that discovers a foreign intelligence
operation and files a SAR accordingly. The FBI currently
offers rewards to anyone who provides information leading to
the arrest and conviction of a spy.172 Indeed, the FBI will pay
up to $500,000 for this information.173 This sizeable reward
may provide an additional incentive for financial institutions
to comply with the new requirements.
Without doubt, there will be some financial institutions
that will find these incentives insufficient to justify the costs
of implementing the new counterintelligence detection and
reporting requirements. All financial institutions would be
required to follow the new requirements, but there is no
guarantee that any one particular financial institution will
find a spy among its clients. Thus, regulatory risk must also
be imposed. The current AML regime already imposes stiff
regulatory burdens on those financial institutions that fail to
comply with AML requirements.174 A bank that fails to
comply would risk severe monetary penalties and the
possibility of seeing its bank charter revoked.175
Furthermore, those bank employees involved in the violation
risk being removed from the financial institution and barred
from banking.176 Similar penalties could be imposed upon
banks and other financial institutions that fail to comply with
the
newly
imposed
counterintelligence
program
requirements.
Compliance testing can be conducted in
conjunction with general AML examination testing

172. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Counterintelligence, http://www.fbi.gov/
about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/counterintelligence (last visited Jan.
16, 2013) (“Report Espionage! You can pocket up to $500,000 for information
that leads to the arrest and conviction of a spy or to the prevention of espionage.
To report suspicious activities, contact your local field office or submit an
anonymous tip.”).
173. Id.
174. See FFIEC, supra note 82, at 14 (explaining the criminal and civil
penalties for financial institutions that fail to comply with AML requirements).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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procedures already conducted by the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council.177
C. Financial Transaction Typologies That May Suggest
Foreign Intelligence Activity
Of course, requiring financial institutions to report this
information would be useless unless these institutions were
provided foreign intelligence typologies. Providing financial
institutions with the knowledge of what a foreign intelligence
transaction would look like would be the key to the success of
this counterintelligence program. Illustrating this point,
many commentators have noted that one of the major
weaknesses of the current counterterrorism finance regime is
that financial institutions are not offered adequate
information on the typologies that suggest terrorism
finance.178 Furthermore, feedback regarding the helpfulness
of the information is rarely provided to financial institutions
that file SARs.179
Thus, the agencies responsible for the counterintelligence
program using the AML regime as a tool for uncovering
foreign intelligence threats must provide financial
institutions with possible typologies. FinCEN could fund an
analytic review of all SARs filed for all illegals and American
spies caught since FinCEN’s inception. If typologies do
emerge, they could provide this information to financial
institutions and tailor the requirements to account for any
compliance burden that may arise. In addition, interested
counterintelligence units from organizations such as FBI,
CIA, DIA, and NCIX, among others, could collaborate to
propose some suggested typologies based upon their collective
experience of uncovering spies.
While developing a comprehensive list of typologies for
detecting foreign intelligence activities within the United
States would be outside the scope of this Article, this section

177. See id. for a detailed description of current AML examination
techniques.
178. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 130, at 27 (“In this
report, we recommended that FinCEN further develop and document its
strategy to fully incorporate best practices to help enhance and sustain
collaboration among federal agencies in the form change process and distribute
that documentation to all stakeholders.”); Gordon, supra note 21, at 727.
179. Id.
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will discuss those client or transaction characteristics that
could most readily be included in such a list.
1. Client is Employed in an Industry Frequently
Targeted by Foreign Intelligence Agencies
The primary indicator that a transaction is related to
foreign intelligence activity would be a suspicious transaction
conducted by an individual employed by the federal
government or in an industry frequently targeted by foreign
intelligence agencies. In a study conducted by the Defense
Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC), the
Center found money to be the dominant factor that led
Americans to spy on their own country.180 While nearly half
of those Americans engaged in espionage were never paid,
this is primarily because counterintelligence officers caught
most perpetrators before they could transmit information.181
Aldrich Ames, one of the most famous American spies
who passed information to the Soviets over the course of a
decade, reportedly received nearly three million dollars.182
During this time, Ames purchased an expensive home and
automobile in cash.183 It is unlikely that he could have
afforded this behavior on the meager CIA salary he was
receiving at the time.184 While Ames’s conspicuous antics
would probably alert counterintelligence security personnel
regardless of any AML monitoring component, AML efforts
would be able to detect similar but less extreme cases of
espionage in the future. Suspicious transactions made by
employees frequently targeted by foreign intelligence services
could prompt the financial institution to check the Foreign
Intelligence box on the SAR form.
To aid in this effort, these employees should receive
heightened scrutiny under the AML due diligence
requirements. Such efforts could mimic the heightened due
diligence requirements already imposed on PEPs, where
180. HERBIG & WISKOFF, supra note 33, at xii. PERSEREC maintains a
database of information on those individuals known to have engaged in
espionage against the United States, and provides analytic reports
summarizing the data and suggesting common characteristics that have
motivated spies in the past. Id. at v.
181. Id. at xi.
182. TURNER, supra note 24, at 134.
183. Id. at 136.
184. Id.

4_SKERRY FINAL.doc

234

6/24/2013 7:59 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:53

financial institutions give greater review to those customers
who are considered to be more risky. When ascertaining the
identity and occupation of the client, the bank could make an
effort to identify the client’s employer. Those clients working
for the government, within the defense industry, and in
industries involved in sensitive technologies would receive
greater AML scrutiny. Similar measures should also be
taken for those clients working for a government contractor or
companies similarly associated with U.S. policymakers.
Indeed, one-fourth of civilian American spies worked for
contractors at the time they engaged in acts of espionage.185
Because financial institutions will absorb the majority of
these heightened monitoring costs, the counterintelligence
community should take on the responsibility of identifying
the industries and corporations that are most at-risk and
therefore deserve increased attention. It would be the
counterintelligence community that has the most readily
available information on employers that are at-risk of foreign
intelligence penetration. Outside of the defense and weapons
industries, the technologies most heavily targeted by foreign
intelligence collectors include “aeronautics, information
systems, lasers and optics, sensors, and marine systems.”186
Counterintelligence officials could compile lists of companies
within these industries, as well as those government agencies
and contractors that warrant increased scrutiny. Such a
process would need to be continuous, as government
organization and economic situations change over time.
2. Client Has Poor Credit
Credit ratings could also be used by financial institutions
to identify espionage. Of those Americans who committed
espionage on behalf of other countries for money, only about
twenty percent committed espionage for purposes of greed.187
In contrast, half of these Americans engaged in espionage

185. HERBIG & WISKOFF, supra note 33, at xi.
186. ONCIX, supra note 8, at iii.
187. HERBIG & WISKOFF, supra note 33, at 41. “Some people spied for money
because they needed it to pay off debts or to get themselves out of some other
fix, while others did so from greed. We coded ‘need or greed’ variables and the
type of financial pressures or luxury purchases reported for our cases where
these details were available.” Id. at 40.
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because they were in financial trouble.188 This can include
financial insolvency, bankruptcy, or late payments on various
forms of debt.189 For example, Russian KGB operatives
recruited Richard Miller, an FBI counterintelligence officer
struggling to make his mortgage payments.190 He traded
classified material for $50,000 in gold, several cash payments
of unknown amounts, and sexual favors from a female KGB
officer.191
Similarly, Bruce Ott of the U.S. Air Force
attempted to pass classified material to the KGB in 1986 to
alleviate his debt problems.192 Ott’s peer described him as “ ‘a
spendthrift who bounced checks, overused his credit cards,
had his car repossessed, and was in such financial trouble on
his honeymoon that his wife footed the entire bill.’ ” 193 While
this Article has already proposed imposing heightened due
diligence on all employees within the government and
sensitive technology industries, poor credit ratings of those
employees could warrant the highest form of scrutiny.
In the alternative, credit ratings could be used as a
means of limiting the number of employees subject to
heightened scrutiny. For example, if financial institutions
argue that it would be economically unfeasible to impose
increased due diligence standards on all employees within the
government and sensitive technology industries, credit
ratings could be used to narrow the scope of the scrutiny to
those employees most at-risk of espionage recruitment.
3. The Transaction Involves a Possible Foreign
Intelligence Front Organization
Foreign intelligence services engage extensively in covert
intelligence operations within the United States using “front
organizations.”194 The goals of these organizations are to
conduct business that advances the intelligence service’s
interests without maintaining any apparent links to a foreign
government, or provide nonofficial cover for intelligence
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 40–41.
192. Id. at 41.
193. Id. (quoting G. Kell, Alleged Spy “Glad It Was Over,” SACRAMENTO BEE,
July 31, 1986).
194. Kevin A. O’Brien, Covert Action: The “Quiet Option” in International
Statecraft, in 3 STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 23, 40 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2007).
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operatives.195 Identification of money laundering activities
conducted by these front organizations could prompt a
financial institution to file a foreign intelligence SAR.
This Article recognizes three instances where financial
institutions should file a foreign intelligence SAR when an
organization or company within the United States engages in
suspicious financial activity. First, some front organizations
do indeed have overt ties to a foreign nation’s government.196
For example, communist and socialist parties have engaged
in political advocacy in the past through the use of front
organizations.197
Other organizations are owned and
controlled directly by another nation’s government and there
are some intelligence services that take advantage of this
control.198 For example, during the Cold War, the KGB would
often act as a filter for any Soviet organization operating in a
foreign country.199 Any suspicious transactions carried out by
such organizations should be reported through a foreign
intelligence SAR.
Second, an organization or company that attempts to
hide the nature of its control may justify the filing of a foreign
intelligence SAR. A shell company is an entity such as a
corporation, limited liability company, or trust that has no
physical presence except a mailing address and generates
little, if any, economic value.200 Shell companies use “bearer
shares, nominee shareholders, and nominee directors . . . to
mask ownership in [the] corporate entity.”201 The AML
community has already identified the use of shell companies
in transactions as a potential indicator of general money
laundering activity.202 While shell companies are often used

195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. See U.S. MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESSMENT WORKING GRP., U.S.
MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESSMENT 47 (2005), available at http://
www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/new_6_2006/FinCEN%20Feb%2006
%20ML.pdf.
201. Id.
202. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (FINCEN), FIN-2006-G014,
POTENTIAL MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS RELATED TO SHELL COMPANIES (2006),
passim, available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/Advisory
OnShells_FINAL.pdf (“Shell companies have become common tools for money
laundering and other financial crimes, primarily because they are easy and
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for legitimate purposes, they can be used in illicit
transactions to hide the true identities of the company
owners.203
Some front organizations begin as a legitimate enterprise
but their control is later assumed by foreign intelligence
services.204 If a company doing business in the United States
were to engage in transactions with a shell company, the
financial institution may investigate the nature of the
transaction. If it becomes apparent that the shell company is
being used to hide the origin of control, and if that control is
connected to a foreign nation, this type of transaction may
suggest foreign intelligence operations and may warrant a
filing.
Third, regardless of their ownership or origin,
organizations and companies doing business in the sensitive
technology industries should also be subject to a level of
heightened scrutiny, similar to the previously suggested
scrutiny imposed upon individuals employed within that
industry.
Foreign intelligence SAR filings would be
appropriate for any suspicious transaction conducted by a
company in one of these industries.
CONCLUSION
The United States currently has an intricate system in
place to monitor financial transactions for irregular activity
that may suggest criminal behavior. At the present time, the
system is designed to defeat money laundering and terrorism
finance efforts. With several small changes, however, the
system could be used as a powerful tool in the detection of
foreign intelligence activity. A counterintelligence program
that uses the current AML regime would not be foolproof;
many spies have motivations beyond monetary gain.205 But
the transactions of those individuals and organizations that
are increasingly targeted by foreign intelligence services
would be under much greater scrutiny and could provide
inexpensive to form and operate.”).
203. U.S. MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESSMENT WORKING GRP., supra
note 200, at 47–48 (“The use of these legal structures for money laundering is
well established.”); see FINCEN, supra note 202, at 4.
204. See U.S. MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESSMENT WORKING GRP.,
supra note 200, at 47.
205. See HERBIG & WISKOFF, supra note 33, at 40.
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counterintelligence officials a wealth of information about
potential threats.
The advantages of implementing such a system are
apparent. First, many SARs filed by financial institutions are
not sufficiently scrutinized for counterintelligence-related
activity by FinCEN because of the agency’s decision to
prioritize terrorism finance-related transactions.
The
proposed program would use counterintelligence resources to
analyze many of the unviewed SARs, which could improve
counterintelligence operations. Second, the program would
improve detection of suspicious transactions related to foreign
intelligence by prompting a concerted effort by
counterintelligence officials to suggest and provide financial
institutions with concrete typologies of such transactions.
And third, it would make those employees and organizations
in a position to be targeted by foreign intelligence services
under heightened scrutiny in the current AML regime.
Ultimately, it is important to remember that AML efforts
are not unique to the United States.206 Nothing prevents
foreign nations from conducting similar counterintelligence
operations using their own AML programs. One thing is
certain: lessons that may be learned from the implementation
of this program would provide our own U.S. intelligence
officers working overseas the know-how and capabilities of
concealing their transactions and avoiding detection by
foreign counterintelligence units. Should the United States
fall behind in the cat-and-mouse world of intelligence? Or
should it remain one step ahead of its adversaries, pioneering
a new form of proactive counterintelligence?

206. Most AML laws implemented by the United States are in accordance
with international standards set forth by FATF. SCHOTT, supra note 22, at III7–III-8.

